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Is America Being Sold Out?
HE LAST time the U.S. current account
balance was in surplus was in 1981. During the
seven years 1982-88, U.S. deficits averaged over
$100 billion. Capital inflows from foreign in-
vestors have reduced the U.S. foreign invest-
ment position steadily from a net [1.5. claim of
S141.1 billion at the end of 1981 to net foreign
claims on the United States of $368.2 billion at
the end of 1987.
Much of the commentary on this reversal has
presumed the loss of U.S. economic sovereignty,
declining opportunities for American labor, and
a reduction in the U.S. standard of living. In
rebutting these concerns, analysts have general-
ly concentrated on selected aspects of the
phenomenon. For example, recent articles have
focused on the relative pace of foreign direct in-
vestment, in particular, Japanese direct invest-
ment, while others have singled out the benefits
of capital inflows for both American investors
and laborl
This article takes a broader perspective to
review the full range of concerns about foreign
investment, both from a logical and an empiri-
cal vantage. The public concerns about the flow
of foreign investment and its anxiety about the
implications of the U.S. net international debtor’
status are each addressed. We begin with an
overview of recent public opinion polls about
foreign investment in the United States, and
then consider the data on foreign investment.
The potential for a foreign takeover of the U.S.
economy and the pattern of foreign investment
in the United States relative to U.S. investment
abroad are examined.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES IN THE l9SOs
In assessing the implications of foreign invest-
ment in the United States during the 1980s, it is
useful to examine three dimensions of the
foreign capital inflows. First is the perception of
foreign investment as reported by the media
and recorded in public opinion polls. Since
perceptions are often as important as facts, it is
appropriate to begin with them. If there were
no perceived threat, it is unlikely that any
policy actions would be considered; certainly,
the threat of foreign ownership of U.S. assets
would not be an issue in the public forum. Sec-
ond is the paltern of foreign investment. The
concern seems to be chiefly that foreigners will
obtain control of certain U.S. industries vital to
1Anderson (1988) focuses on direct investment mispercep-
tions, Little (1988) discusses the relatively small magnitude
of both direct and portfolio investment, Makmn (1988b)
discusses the Japanese investment patterns in the United
States, Rosengreen (1988) discusses direct investment by
foreigners and compared with U.S foreign direct invest-
ment and Weidenbaum (1988) argues that capital inflows
are beneficial. Francis (1988) recounts an interview with
Milton Friedman in which he argues that the U.S. foreign
asset position is understated to the extent that he doubts
the U.S. is a net debtor. Ulan and Dewald (1989) estimate
adjustments to obtain a corrected U.S. net international in-
vestment balance. From a different vantage, Hweko and
Chediek (1988) describe the ruinous consequences follow-
ing Argentine dictator Juan Peron’s drive for “economic
independence” through import substitution and restrictions
on foreign investment.
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national security, industries traditionally
dominated by U.S. firms, or high-technology in-
dustries. Third is the reported magnitude of
foreign investment. If the magnitude of such in-
vestment is negligible, there cannot be much
threat to U.S. overall interests. If the magnitude
is substantial, the inflow of foreign capital must
be evaluated on its merits.
The Perception of Foreign Invest-
ment in the United States
Opinion polls unambiguously reveal that the
American public is concerned about increased
foreign ownership of U.S. firms and real estate.2
A poll by the Roper Organization in March 1988
found that 84 percent of the respondents
thought that foreign companies buying more
companies and real estate in America is not “a
good idea for the U.S.” In the same poll, by a 49
percent to 45 percent plurality, respondents
disapproved of new jobs for Americans in
foreign-owned plants, and at least 72 percent
thought that foreign companies’ investments
should be restricted.~In May 1988, a CBS
News/NewYork Times survey found that 51 per-
cent of a national sample agreed that the “in-
crease in foreign investment poses a threat to
American economic independence.”~Similar
findings were reported by other polling firms.5
Moreover, the uneasiness is not limited to
Americans outside of the opinion-making elite.
Last year, Sen. James Exon of Nebraska sup-
ported legislation “to give the Pentagon the right
to veto” foreign takeovers of defense contrac-
tors; this provision was ultimately incorporated
in the 1988 trade act. The political attrac-
tiveness of the issue is very strong:
Actions from Japanese land purchases in Hawaii to a
British corporate takeover attempt in Pittsburgh fuel
grass-roots worries, ‘The farther away you get from
washington,’ the greater the reaction ‘that America
should belong to Americans,’ says one antitakeover
group official.~
The political furor and public uneasiness con-
tinue in early 1989. A controversial bill calling
for greater disclosure by foreign investors was
scheduled for a quick vote in the House of
Representatives but was withdrawn by the
Speaker of the House after an “explosion of pro-
test in the Bush administration.”7 In a survey
for the Washington Post-ABC News Poll in mid-
February 1989, “Forty-five percent said Japanese
citizens should not be allowed to buy property
in the United States, and eight of 10 said there
should be a limit on how many U.S. companies
the Japanese should be allowed to buy.”~
The Pattern of Foreign Investment
in the United States in the 1980s
There has been pronounced opposition to
direct investment in the United States by
foreigners, especially the Japanese. Direct in-
vestment is defined as a 10 percent or greater
ownership share in a firm. Foreign direct in-
vestment in American firms has been the focus
of the greatest unease. Such investment can
take place either through stock purchases or
the creation of new enterprises in the United
States by foreigners, with or without U.S. part-
ners. The seriousness of this concern is ex-
emplified by excerpts from an editorial by
Malcolm Forbes:
BEFORE JAPAN BUYS TOO MUCH OF THE
U.S.A.
We must instantly legislate a presidentially ap-
pointed Board of Knowledgeables whose approval
would be required before any foreign purchase of
any significance would be allowed of any conse-
quential U.S. company—regardless of size s
one thing for the Japanese and Germans and
others to buy U.S. government bonds to finance
our huge trade imbalances with them. But it’s a
2For a comprehensive accounting of this view, see Tolchin
and Tolchmn (1988). Other briefer accounts, supporting in
varying degrees the Tolchins’ concerns, are in Baer
(1988), Burgess (1989), Fierman (1988), Jenkins (1988),
Norton (1988), O’Reilly (1988), Skrzycki (1988), and “Mr.
Greenspan on the Gas Tax” (1988). Even those who make
their skepticism obvious—such as Friedman (1988),
Kinsley (1988), Makin (1988a,b), “Buying into a Good
Thing” (1988)—imply that the notion has received such
frequent airing as to become conventional wisdom.
3Baer (1988), p.24.
4”Opinion Roundup” (1988).
5Hamilton, Frederick & Schneiders reported that “78 per-
cent of Americans favor laws limiting foreign investment in
real estate and business” IJenkins, p. 451 and Smick
Medley & Associates found that “nearly 80 percent of
Americans outside of the opinion-making elite would like to
limit foreign buying, and 40 percent want to halt it
altogether. ‘Joe America is nervous and suspicious,’ says
the firm’s president, David Smick. ‘He is worried about
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Figure 1
U.S. vs. Foreign Direct Investment
whole and totally impermissible other thing for
them to use their vast billions of dollars to buy
great chunks of America’s big businesses, or take
over the high~tech,medical or other strategic, vital
U.S. concerns.9
Figure 1 shows that since the advent of
floating exchange rates in the early 1970s,
foreign direct investment in the United States
has grown faster than U.S. direct investntent
abroad—an annual gi’owth rate of 18.7 percent
vs. 7.6 percent. Consequently, the relative size
of foreign direct investment has risen—from
about 22 percent of U.S. foreign direct invest-
ment in 1975 to about 85 percent in 1987. Of
the $41.5 billion of direct U.S. investment by
foreigners in 1987, nearly half, $19.1 billion,
was in U.S. manufacturing.
The Magnitude of Foreign Invest-
ment in the United States in the
1980s
Table 1 shows the estimated composition of
foreign investment in the United States and of
U.S. investment abroad at the end of 1975 and
1980.87.10 These data reveal that, since 1975,
9Forbes,(1988).Similar views are recounted in Makin
(1988b) and expressed throughout Tolchin and Tolchin
(1988).
10Note that the U.S. government gold stock reported in table
1 is vastly understated relative to its market value. In the
table, the official U.S. government gold entry is computed
using an accounting price of $42.22 per troy ounce. If its
value were computed using a value closer to its market
value in the 1980s, say $400 per ounce, the entry in table
1 for U.S. official gold would be about $100 billion rather
than $11 billion.
Billions of dollars Billions of dollars
350 350
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foreign assets in the United States have in-
creased much faster than U.S. assets abroad.
This pattern of faster foreign asset growth is
even more pronounced if the comparison is
made from 1981, the last year of an American
trade surplus, to 1987. From a net claim on
foreigners of $141.1 billion, the United States
has become the world’s largest debtor, with
estimated net liabilities to foreigners of $368.2
billion. During this interval, foreign assets in-
creased by 165 percent compared with 62 per-
cent for U.S. assets abroad.
The disparity in accumulation is even greater
for assets held by private investors, that is, total
foreign investment less U.S. securities held by
foreign governments and central banks. Over
the seven years 1981-87, private foreign invest-
ment in the United States more than tripled,
from $398 billion to $1253 billion. The bulk of
these capital inflows have gone into foreign
holdings of U.S. securities— corporate stocks
and bonds and government notes and bonds—
and liabilities of U.S. banks—deposits by foreign-
ers. Together, these two asset categories ac-
count for about three-fourths of the increase in
private foreign investment in the United States,
$643 billion of the $855 billion total.
The size of the foreign claims raises another
issue, the cost of servicing the net foreign in-
debtedness. Peter Drucker (1988) has called this
“the looming transfer crisis”:
ours is the only major industrial country that
has a significant foreign indebtedness, not only
governmental but private as well, and that
therefore has a significant foreign exchange re-
quirement. By 1991 we will need close to $1
billion to cover our foreign exchange remittances,
about $500 million for the federal debt. -. And
there is no way to earn that in our foreign trans-
actions. No way. Even if we balance our trade, we
won’t have that much surplus.
Starkly put, Drucker believes that the accu-
mulation of U.S. assets by foreigners will force
the United States to repudiate its debts, either
directly, indirectly by inflation or by reducing
the nominal value of the dollar: “As long as we
can knock down the dollar without domestic in-
flation, I think that is the best thing to hope
for.” Such a policy would be injurious not only
to foreign investors but to U.S. interests as well,
To see why, consider why foreigners invest in
the United States and how U.S. labor and in-
vestors each benefit from such investment.
WHY DO FOREIGNERS INVEST IN
THE UNITED STATES?
There are three reasons for foreign invest-
ment in the United States or for U.S. investment
abroad: greater profit, lower risk and the trade
deficit. The first, greater profit, is the funda-
mental reason, as it is for any other investment
choice. The investor chooses one asset over
another because it has a higher risk-adjusted
rate of return. Both critics of foreign invest-
ment such as the Tolchins (1988) and defenders
of unimpeded capital flows such as Makin
(1988a,b) and Poole (1988) are agreed: Foreign
investment is motivated primarily by profit.”
Speaking of the capital flows from Japan and
Europe to the United States, Poole observes that:
Two rate of return conditions are relevant. First,
Japanese saving invested in the United States is in
the interest of the U.S. if the rate of return we
pay to the Japanese is less than the return we
earn on the invested capital, and there is no
evidence that this condition is not met. Second,
Japanese investment in the United States is in the
interest of Japan if the rate of return Japan
receives in the United States is greater than the
rate of return available in Japan. Given the
declines in Japan’s growth rate and investment
share, and evidence that the rate of return in the
Japanese equity and fixed income markets is cx-
tt’emely low, it is highly likely that both of these
rate-of-return conditions were met from 1981 to
1985, and perhaps later. For Europe, it seems
clear that the declining investment share is a
supply-side problem; incentives to produce are too
low because of high marginal tax rates and labor
market rigidities. Europe also provides substantial
subsidies to weak and inefficient enterprises. U.S.
policies have, if anything, raised European growth
in the 1980s by providing a large market for Euro-
pean exports. Thus, the two rate-of-return condi-
tions discussed fo,’ Japan also apply to Europe)’
One important implication of Poole’s discussion is
that Drucker’s concern about being able to fi-
nance the (1.5. foreign obligations becomes moot.
11”Political leaders should remember that foreign investors
are very anxious to invest in the United States, and that
they invest primarily for market share and profits, and
everything else is secondary.” [Tolchin and Tolchin (1988),
p.27l1 See also Poole (1988), p.44.
“Poole (1988), pp.45-6.
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The second motivation for foreign investment
is to reduce the risks of wealth loss due to un-
foreseen exchange rate changes.13 This proposi-
tion is simply an extension of the risk reduction
principle of portfolio diversification to interna-
tional alternatives. Portfolio diversification—
spreading wealth across several assets rather
than a single security—reduces losses due to un-
foreseen events.
Similarly, exchange rate risk can be hedged
by holding several assets denominated in dif-
ferent currencies rather than all in a single cur-
rency. The investor’s wealth is insured against
rising or falling by the full amount of any un-
foreseen exchange rate change. A corollary of
this is that multinational firms can reduce the
unforeseen variability of their production costs
and market sales by producing and selling in
several countries rather than in a single one.
The third reason for foreign investment is
that it accompanies trade deficits. Foreign in-
vestment induced by higher yields or portfolio
diversification occurs whether or not interna-
tional trade is in balance; however, trade
deficits imply that net foreign investment must
occur in the amount by which trade is in
deficit.1’ Yet it would be incorrect to infer from
this accounting identity that trade deficits cause
foreign capital inflows. In other words, foreign
investment is not undertaken simply to finance
the trade deficit; indeed, it may well be that the
capital inflows cause trade deficits:
The international accounts too, are more likely he
driven from the capital side than the merchandise
side. In this era of instant capital transactions, a
year’s worth of world trade amounts to only a
week’s worth of capital flows. The U.S. trade
deficit arose when U.S. banks stopped exporting
capital to developing nations, and when, because
of the Reagan tax cuts, the U.S. economy was the
only growth opportunity in the world. These
developments resulted in a tremendous net capital
inflow; the deficit in merchandise trade was
necessary to balance the equation.”
Thus, capital flows appear to be generated by
investors’ self-interested profit-seeking. There is
broad agreement that, whatever other effects
international capital flows may have on
domestic economies, foreign investment makes
investors and sellers of assets wealthier than
they would be if their investment and sales
were restricted to domestic assets and buyers.
Nonetheless, this leaves open the issue of how
labor is affected by international capital flows.
BENEFITS -TO DOMESTIC LABOR
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Labor and the owners of capital share the
value added in production created by transfor-
ming raw materials into output. Capital is just a
generic term for the tools, buildings, land,
patents, copyrights, trademarks and goodwill
that labor uses to convert one set of goods—
raw materials—into another—finished output.
The value of each factor of production in a
market economy is its opportunity cost, that is,
what the raw materials, labor or capital could
produce in their most profitable alternative
application.
In most cases, labor and capital are com-
plementary, so that an increase in the quantity
of one raises the productivity, hence, the value
“Anticipated changes in exchange rates are reflected in the
differences between the rates of return on assets in dif-
ferent currencies. For example, if it is widely anticipated
that the British pound sterling will decline by 5 percent in
exchange value vs. the dollar in the coming year, then the
interest rate on British securities will be 5 percent higher
than the interest rate on U.S. securities of similar risk.
This relation between interest and exchange rates is
known as interest rate parity; for a discussion, see Koediik
and Ott (1987), pp. 5-7.
‘4Actually, the recorded capital inflows—the capital account
balance—have been persistently smaller than the broadest
measure of the trade deficits—the current account
balance—throughout the 1980s. This error—the statistical
discrepancy—has averaged over $20 billion annually,
which is between one-seventh and one-fifth ofthe current
account deficit. For a review of the relation between the
international trade and capital accounts and the statistical
discrepancy, see Ott (1988), pp 3-13.
‘5Bartley (1988). See also Tatom (1987, 1989). Poole (1988),
p. 42, points out that “the issue of causation is complex
and should be discussed with care.” Heller (1989), p. 2,
notes that foreigners are financing attractive investments
for which U.S. total saving is insufficient:
the ldomestic governmenl~deficit is still substantial in relation
to domestic savings and uses up funds that are needed for private
sector investment. Thus far the US economy has enjoyed the con-
fidence of foreign investors, preventing serious crowding-out’ of the
private sector in financial markets.
Wayne Angell, Heller’s colleague on the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, also has observed
that the capital inflows are beneficial:
“I’m not irritated or upset about capital inflows into the united
States. Capital inflows do tend to increase our productivity” “Capital
InflowsCalled Helpful” (1988)
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of the services, of the other. For example, pro-
viding an auto mechanic or a carpenter with
more tools increases the amount or quality of
work they can accomplish; this increase in pro-
ductivity leads to a rise in their wages, or, at
the same wages, to an increase in the number
of them employed.
Consequently, to the extent that foreign in-
vestment is an increment of capital that would
otherwise not be available for labor to use, the
foreign capital must unambiguously be
beneficial to labor.’’ Equally true, the availabili-
ty of foreign capital lowers the cost of capital to
owners; this makes additions to plant and equip-
ment cheaper, makes possible some investment
projects that otherwise would not occur and
raises the value of firms.” Thus, even if the
foreign capital does not directly affect the
ownership of the firm, it benefits labor and
asset owners by lowering interest rates, the cost
of capital.
Ibis discussion can be summarized in five
postulates about the expected gains and losses
from the addition of foreign capital:
(i) Labor gains as the incremental capital
raises the productivity of labor, increasing
the amount of labor that can be employed
or the wages of those who are employed;
(ii) Owners of firms—the shareholders—
benefit by the lower interest rates implied
by higher asset prices;
(iii) Consumers gain as a result of the lower
prices of goods implied by the increased
labor productivity;
(iv) The profitability of financial intermediaries
may decline since the value of their ser-
vices in bringing borrowers and lenders
together is inversely related to the supply
of capital. Moreover, the entry of foreign
financial intermediaries makes the industry
more competitive, which also tends to
reduce the rate return;
(v) Savers may lose interest income as a result
of lowered interest rates due to the
greater capital availability. This loss is off-
set, to some extent, as they receive capital
gains on their existing fixed-rate portfolio
holdings for the same reason as in (ii).
Since foreign investment raises the amount of
capital available, labor productivity rises as does
the absolute income of labor. Labor is better off
with more capital than with less, and the na-
tionality of the investor is a matter of indif-
ference to labor.18
THE MYTHICAL THREAT OF
WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN
CAPITAL
In early 1989, the U.S. economy continues its
longest peacetime expansion on record, so the
dangers of foreign investment are posed as the
potential calamity of an abrupt foreign
withdrawal. This scenario was described by a
‘6Recent media discussions of worker views on foreign
ownership of their firms have revealed a general absence
of hostility by workers and their unions, emphasizing in-
stead the benefits of the employment made possible by
the capital inflow. Holusha (1989) quotes two automobile
workers at the Nummi joint venture of Toyota and General
Motors as follows:
“I can’t honestly say I like it better lthan when it was a G.M. plantI,
but I’m working and that’s better.’
and
‘We got a second chance here, and we are trying to take advantage
of it. Many people don’t get a second chance.”
The Tolchins’(1988) single out Volkswagen of America as
being “a notable exception to the anti-union flavor of
many foreign owned companies.” (p. 178) Ironically, the
other foreign automakers castigated by the Toichins con-
tinue operations and employment of labor in the United
States, while Volkswagen ceased U.S. production in 1988.
“The elimination of restrictions on foreign ownership can
raise the wealth ofdomestic asset owners, as recently il-
lustrated in a policy change by Nestle, a Swiss corpora-
tion; see Dullforce (1988a). In late November 1988, Nestle
announced that, henceforth, it would sell registered shares
to any buyer, whether or not that buyer was a Swiss resi-
dent. As a result of the eradication ofthe distinction bet-
ween its two types of common stock, registered (formerly
restricted to residents) and bearer (available to
nonresidents), common shares of both types now sell for
about the same price. Before the change, bearer shares
had sold for about twice the price of registered shares.
See Financial Times Market Staff (1988). Removing the
restriction on foreign buyers’ ability to buy the resident
shares realized a4 0percent wealth gain for Swiss resi-
dent shareholders. Nestle reportedly makes up about 11
percent of the capitalized value of the Swiss stock market
shares, and its decision may influence other Swiss cor-
porations’ equity policies. This change opens up the
possibility of foreign ownership of Swiss corporations; ap-
parently, Swiss Nestle stockholders are willing to bear this
cost. The Governor of the Swiss National Bank also has
argued that the market for financial assets in Switzerland
must not discriminate on the nationality of the buyer if the
country is to remain an important center for capital tran-
sactions; see Dullforce (19BBc). Similar arguments are of-
fered in a discussion ofthe European Community’s
eradication of capital restrictions by Greenhouse (1988).
laIn the 1988 Presidential campaign, the Democratic can-
didate, Michael Dukakis, told a group of workers at a St.
Louis automotive parts plant, “Maybe the Republican
ticket wants our children to work for foreign owners but
that’s not the kind of a future Lloyd Bentsen and I and
Dick Gephardt and you want for America.” The workers
addressed by the candidate had been employed by an













prominent New York investment banker as
follows:
The dollar will eventually fall, he notes, and when
it does and interest rates decline in a period of
recession, foreign investors would withdraw their’
portfolio investments, triggering a banking crisis.
These foreign investors then could use their in-
flated portfolios to make direct investments of
American industry at “bargain basement
prices. -- We will have financed our deficit by
putting up permanent assets.””
This scenario entails the confluence of four
events: a decline in the dollar’s exchange value;
a cyclical decline in U.S. interest rates; a
withdrawal and subsequent re-entry of foreign
investment; and a banking crisis induced by the
foreign withdrawal. Thus, to evaluate the dan-
gers posed by foreign ownership of 11.5. assets,
one must investigate not just the likelihood of
each of these events but their joint likelihood,
including whether they are mutually consistent.
Decline of the Dollar
From its peak in February 1985, the exchange
value of the dollar averaged against the prin-
cipal industrial currencies has fallen more than
40 percent.’°As shown in figure 2, it has fallen
by about one-third against the pound, by
almost one-half vs. the yen and by over two-
fifths in terms of the Deutsche mark. Yet, there
has been no sign of a widespread flight from
‘9Attributed to Felix Rohatyn, p.28, in Tolchin and Tolchin
(1988); this scenario is repeated nearly verbatim on pp.
197-98 and again on p. 201. See also Baer (1988), Pier-
man (1988), Jenkins (1988), Makin (1988a,b) and Norton
(1988).
‘°Thetrade-weighted exchange rate of the dollar against the
other Group of Ten countries plus Switzerland hit a peak
of 158.43 (1973=100.00) in February 1985; it was below
90.0 in late 1987 and has a value of 91.88 in January
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dollar assets. Even the record stock-market crash
of October 1987, when the dollar’s exchange value
was at its nadir, did not suffice to trigger a
massive withdrawal of foreign capital.”
Cyclical Decline of IJ~S.Interest
Rates
Generally, differences in interest rates in one
currency vs. another are just sufficient to offset
the anticipated depreciation of the higher-
interest currency vs. the lower-interest curren-
cy as reflected in their forward exchange rate.”
While interest rates do decline in recessions, the
benefit to an investor from selling U.S. assets
and shifting to another currency at such times
is limited by the likely state of other economies.
The world’s major economies are so economical-
ly integrated that periods of recession in the
U.S. economy are generally also periods of
recession in the other’ economies in which at-
tractive substitute investments would be
available. Consequently, to the extent that both
interest rates and asset prices were to fall in
the U.S. economy, the same pattern is likely to
have occurred in the rest of the industrial
economies as well, so a shift from U.S. to
foreign assets would accrue no profit. If other
economies’ asset prices and interest rates had
not fallen with those in the United States, then
the depreciation of the dollar’s exchange rate
would obviate the benefit of such a withdrawal.
Withdrawal and Subsequent
Re-entry of’ Foreign Investment
Investors withdrawing their funds from U.S.
assets must do it in two steps—first selling the
asset and then using the cash (dollar) proceeds
to buy another asset, either another U.S. asset
or a foreign currency. An investor selling an
asset from a portfolio is, by that action, buying
something else—a stock, a bond, a piece of real
estate, a quantity of money denominated in
some currency.” When the dollar proceeds are
exchanged for foreign currency, some other in-
vestors will acquire the original asset and the
U.S. dollars. In the spirit of the scenario, if only
domestic U.S. investors are buying the U.S.
assets from the prior foreign owners, both a
U.S. capital outflow and a sharply declining
dollar exchange rate will occur. The capital
outflow can only occur if the United States has
a trade surplus.’~In reality, massive withdraw-
als of foreign capital cannot occur in the short
run. Prices and exchange rates adjust first; in-
ternational payments flows adjust with a sub-
stantial lag. Nonetheless, if this unlikely abrupt
swing from trade deficit to surplus were to oc-
cur because of the foreigners’ panic sales, the
assets would end up in U.S. investors’ hands at
considerably lower prices. If foreigners repur-
chased them shortly thereafter, the result
would be increased prices and an appreciation
of the exchange value of the dollar with the
resulting profit accruing to domestic owners.
‘1ln part, this is simply an illustration of the intercon-
nectedness of the world’s economies. All major stock
market around the globe crashed together:
All malor world markets declined substantially in that month
lOctober 19871, which is itself an exceptional fact that contrasts
with the usual modest correlations of returns across coun-
tries....The United States had the fifth sma/fest decline, i.e., the fifth
best performance, in local currency units. However, because the
dollar declined against most currencies, the u.s. performance
restated in a common currency was only 11th out of 23.. lAIn at-
tempt was made to ascertain how much of October’s crash could
be ascribed to the normal response of each country’s stock market
to a worldwide marketmovement, A world market index was con-
structed and found to be statistically related to monthly returns in
every country during the period from the beginning of 1981 up until
the month before the crash. The magnitude of market response dif-
fers materially across countries, The response coefficient, or
“beta” was by far the most statistically significant explanatory
variable in the October crash, It swamped the influences of the in-
stitutional market characteristics, Roll (1989), pp.65-6
22This relation between interest rate differences and an-
ticipated exchange rate changes (primarily due to inflation
rate differences) is called covered interest parity (CIP). The
evidence supporting the absence of profitable speculative
opportunities due to CIP is overwhelming. While there is
also evidence of risk premia in interest differentials, such
evidence also suggests that these premia are a return for
the cost of risk-bearing, not a pure profit. See Koedijk and
Ott (1987).
“The scenario at this point makes a distinction between
foreign investors’ portfolio and direct investment:
“withdraw their portfolio investments..,then could use
their inflated portfolios to make direct investments at
bargain basement prices...” This presumes a distinction
between bond and stock prices which is inconsistent. Ac-
cording to the scenario, the dollar and all other U.S. asset
prices fall, so it would be irrelevant where foreign in-
vestors’ portfolios were initially invested. Moreover, since
direct investment is simply a 10 percent or greater holding
in a corporation, the distinction between “portfolio” and
“direct investment” holdings of common shares is one of
degree, not of kind.
24lt is unlikely, but conceivable that a swap of U.S. assets
for foreign assets could take place without any impact on
the balance of payments; however, this would require that
the assets exchange in exactly balanced total values, the
value of U.S. assets sold equaling the value of foreign
assets sold. In contrast, the scenario being reviewed
postulates a declining dollar, suggesting that the U.S.
assets are no longer as desirable as they were at their
prior prices. Consequently, with falling U.S. asset prices
and foreigners engaging in net sales, a capital outflow is




Here the scenario presumes that foreigners,
having sold their portfolios, then convert their
dollar deposits to nondollar currencies. To do
so, they must buy these currencies from others
who, in turn, end up holding dollar deposits.
This would put downward pressure on the
dollar’s exchange rate and would be associated
with a capital outflow from the United States.
Such substantial withdr’awals—even if replaced
dollar for’ dollar in aggregate—would increase
the uncertainty entailed in asset-liability
management decisions at individual depository
institutions.
In particular, this uncertainty would com-
plicate the matching of the duration of assets
and deposit liabihties. The likely response of
depository institutions to these portfolio shifts
would be an increase in their demand for
reserves, reflected in a rise of the federal funds
rate. Yet, the stress of an abrupt rise in deposit
turnover—whether or not it is associated with a
net outflow of funds from depository
institutions—does not necessarily imply a bank-
ing crisis. Such an implication would require
that the Federal Reserve take no action to ac-
commodate an abrupt shift in the public’s port-
folio preferences. The Fed can and has accom-
modated such increases in the public’s demand
for’ liquidity and the rise in depository institu-
tions’ demand for reserves.’6
Overview of the Foreign
Withdrawal Myth
In summary, the scenario is extremely unlike-
ly to occur. It is internally inconsistent and
depends on inept U.S. monetary policy actions
and irrational investment behavior by both
domestic and foreign investor’. Since interest
rates are linked through integrated international
capital markets, the presumed low (1.5. interest
rates and a depreciating dollar are inconsistent.
Investors, U.S. resident and foreign, are unlikely
to believe that the U.S. monetary authorities
would be passive in the event of a U.S. banking
crisis. l’hey could profit by buying U.S. assets at
prices temporarily depressed by any general
foreign withdrawal and subsequently selling
them back to other chagrined but wiser foreign
investors. In short, rational expectations and the
profit motive induce competitive behavior which
nullifies the threat of widespread foreign capital
withdrawal, the same profit motive that induced
the foreign investment in the first place.’~
HAS FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST-
MENT CHALLENGED CONTROL OF
DOMESTIC US. INDUSTRIES?
Misperceptions about the distribution of
foreign ownership pervade discussions about
foreign investment in the United States. First, as
can be seen in table 1, most foreign investment
is concentrated in portfolio and bank deposits.
In 1987, foreigners held only about 17 percent
of their U.S. assets in direct investment; if of-
ficial assets are excluded, the share of direct in-
vestment rises to about 21 percent. In contrast,
U.S. direct investment abroad is about 26 per’-
cent of the total or 27 percent of private invest-
ment. As the table shows, U.S. direct investment
abroad exceeds foreign direct investment in the
United States. Moreover, the excess of U.S.
direct investment widened in 1987 to $47 billion
from $39.2 billion at the end of 1986.
The acceleration of U.S. foreign direct invest-
ment beginning with 1985 is obvious in figure
1. U.S. foreign direct investment fell from 1981
to 1982 and was stagnant until 1985; during this
25A “banking crisis” can be defined as a widespread loss of
confidence in the solvency of depository institutions
resulting in runs on banks or abrupt rises in interest rates
to deter withdrawals. From the public’s point of view, such
shifts in portfolio preferences away from deposits can be
characterized as an increase in liquidity preference. Such
a crisis could very well be precipitated by sharp declines
in stock and bond prices if deposit holders feared that
banks’ direct losses on portfolio investments or indirect
losses through loans secured by securities endangered
their deposits.
26For example, by a combination of increased open market
purchases of U.S. securities and the indication of greater
accommodation through the discount window, the Fed ob-
viated a potential liquidity crisis in the U.S. financial
system following the October 1987 stock market crash,
‘7Another interpretation of this scenario is that it is simple
lobbying for restrictions on foreign buyers and foreign in-
termediaries. The scenario is intended to engender doubt
about the benefits of unhindered foreign capital inflows.
The policy implication contingent on finding the scenario
credible would be to restrict U.S. investment by foreigners
and foreign investment intermediaries, These restrictions
would lower the supply of capital and raise interest rates
and other costs of financing domestic investment and cor-
porate restructuring. As a result, the services of domestic
financial intermediaries would rise in value. In short, the
argument is of a piece with all regulatory arguments for
restrictions on entry or output—that the increased safety,
purity or quality of the licensed practitioners justifies the
reduced supply and higher cost. See Stigler (1971).
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period, foreign direct investment in the United
States accelerated. Since 1985, however, U.S. in-
vestment abroad has outpaced foreign direct in-
vestment in the United States. While there is a
lively debate about why this resurgence of U.S.
direct investment has occurred, most analysts
argue that it reflects the tax reforms of 1986:
Nonresidential [U.S.) fixed investment rose substan-
tially in 1983-84, but reached a peak in 1985 and
then fell somewhat. The tax reform discussion,
which began in earnest with the Treasury I tax
proposal in November 1984, killed the investment
boom. Further evidence for this view is that U.S.
direct investment abroad rose substantially at the
same time.’2
The second misperception about foreign direct
investment in the United States is the apparent
belief that the Japanese are the principal
foreign direct investors.’2 This notion is incor-
rect. As figure 3a indicates, Japanese direct in-
vestment in the United States ranks a distant
third behind that of the British and the Dutch.
In fact, the European Community holds about
three-fifths of the foreign direct investment in
the United States—$157.7 billion of the $261.9
billion in 1987—nearly five times the Japanese
stake. Of the total investment, direct, portfolio
and bank deposits, Burgess (1988) notes that “at
the end of 1987, Europeans had holdings of
$785 billion, compared to Japan’s $194 billion
[of) assets of all kinds—wholly owned com-
panies, stocks, bonds, bank deposits, real
estate.”
The third misperception is that foreign direct
investment is concentrated in the manufacturing
sector. As shown in figure 3a and 3b, the share
of U.S. direct investment by foreigners in
manufacturing is just over one-third, 35 per-
cent, slightly less than the 41 percent share of
U.S. direct investment abroad in manufacturing.
In terms of country shares, the Japanese have
less than one-sixth of their U.S. direct invest-
ment in manufacturing. The top four areas of
direct investment show substantial similarity. in
descending order, manufacturing, trade,
petroleum and finance are the largest foreign
direct investment areas in the United States,
while manufacturing, petroleum, finance and
wholesale are the largest U.S. direct investment
areas abroad.
Considered at the level of individual firms, the
Japanese record is even less obtrusive.
Rosengren (1988) reports that Japan’s acquisi-
tion of 94 U.S. companies during 1978-87 r’ank-
ed fifth compared with the 640 taken over by
the British, 435 by the Canadians, 150 by the
Germans and 113 by the French. Considering
the year 1987, the Japanese tied for fifth place
with the Germans at 15 acquisitions, well
behind the pace of the British (78), the Cana-
dians (28), the French (19), and the Australians
(17). Rosengren argues that these company pur-
chases tend to be reciprocal in two respects.
First, the U.S. list of companies purchased has
nearly the same country rank order as the
foreign purchases in the United States, and the
particular industries also were similar for the
U.S. and foreign direct. Second, both U.S. and
foreign firms tend to make acquisitions of firms
in their own industries as a means of extending
their markets.
The upshot of Rosengren’s study is that
foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms have exhibited
much the same patterns as U.S. acquisitions of
foreign firms with a twist reflecting the increas-
ing international integration of business: “[M]any
of the foreign acquisitions are partnerships be-
tween foreign investors and U.S. banks and in-
vestment companies.”°
IS THERE ANY CREDIBLE
DANGER FROM FOREIGN
CAPITAL?
Any credible threat from foreign investment
must ultimately depend on the share of foreign
28Poole (1988), p. 46. See also Tatom (1987, 1989).
29For example, see O’Reilly (1988). This view also is implicit
in the excerpt of the editorial by Malcolm Forbes (1988) on
pages 48-49. Its inaccuracy is addressed in Makin (1988b)
and Rosengren (1988).
30Rosengren (1988), p. 50, illustrates this with a clear exam-
ple ofthe financial integration of takeovers:
Classifying an acquisition as“foreign” can be misleading since
the bulk of the purchase may be financed by a domestic com-
pany. Depending on how the deal is structured, those who pro-
vide the financing may have a substantial stake in the outcome
of the acquisition. For example, when Beazer, a British company
announced its $1.85 billion hostile bid for Koppers, much of the
financing was provided by a U.S. company, Shearson/American
Express. Shearson/American Express not only provided $500
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Figure 4
U.S. Net Reproducible Fixed Capital Stock

















ownership of the stock of U.S. assets. That is, a
small proportional share of U.S. capital held by
foreigners is sufficient to preclude the possibili-
ty that foreign investment in the United States
is deleterious. In this section, we show that the
foreign share of U.S. capital, current and pro-
spective, is too small to support the critics’
concern.
The Miniscule Share of Foreign
Ownership of U.S. Capital
The market value and the composition of the
U.S. reproducible fixed net capital stock from
1973 to 1987 is shown in figure 4. From 1973,
when its market value was $3.6 trillion, it has
grown to $12.2 trillion at the end of 1987. Dur-
ing the period of large U.S. current account
deficits beginning in 1982, its annual increase
has averaged more than $0.5 trillion—that is,
more than five times the average capital
inflow—an annual growth rate of about 5.5 per-
cent. its composition in 1987 was $4.1 trillion of
producers’ plant and equipment, $2.4 trillion of
government capital, $4.0 trillion of residential
capital and $1.7 trillion of consumer durable
goods such as automobiles, household fur-
nishings and equipment.3’ For purposes of this
analysis, we will consider the share of the net
U.S. reproducible tangible capital stock (less
consumer durables) that the net foreign invest-
ment could command as collateral.
The composition of U.S. assets held abroad
and foreign assets held in the United States are
shown in table 1. Considered as a potential
Sl3overnment capital, valued at its current estimated
replacement cost, consists of government buildings, plant
and equipment used in government production and roads,
bridges, waterway improvements, etc. State and local
governments hold about two-thirds of the public capital
stock and the federal government one third.
1973 75 77 79 81 83 85 1987
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Figure 5
Ratio of Net Foreign Assets to Net Reproducible
Capital Stock Excluding Consumer Durables
claim collateralized by the U.S. capital stock, the
estimated foreign holding of U.S. claims at year-
end 1987, $1.54 trillion, was about 12.5 percent
of the U.S. reproducible capital stock and 14.6
percent of the nonconsumer capital stock. Con-
sidered as a claim on the producer capital stock,
$4.1 trillion, it amounted to a 37.4 percent
claim. Subtracting estimated U.S. assets abroad
at year-end 1987, $1.17 trillion, from the
foreign claims yields net foreign assets in the
United States, $0.37 trillion, so that the percent-
age foreign claim on the net U.S. reproducible
nonconsumer capital stock at the end of 1987
was 3.5 percent.
In summary, the net current share of U.S.
assets owned by foreigners is implausibly low to
substantiate any potential cornering of U.S.
asset markets. Even so, this leaves open the
question of whether the trend of increasing
foreign ownership poses any such likelihood.
Sustained Capital Inflows Are In-
sufficient to Threaten U.S.
Economic Sovereignty
The U.S. Commerce Department estimates
that the U.S. international investment position
became a net foreign claim in 1985 for the first
time since 1914, -$110.7 billion (see table 1).
Figure 5 shows this net foreign investment
claim as a share of the net U.S reproducible
nonconsumer capital stock. Reflecting the U.S.
trade deficits during the 1980s, the foreign
claim has grown at an average of over $80
billion per year since 1981. Since becoming a
net claim, the foreign percentage claim has
risen to 3.5 percent of this U.S. wealth measure.
Even if the capital inflows persisted indefinite-
ly at their 1988 level of about $120 billion, this
need not result in an eventual foreign control of
the U.S. economy in the sense of majority
foreign ownership of U.S. nonconsumer assets.
This is because the U.S. capital stock also is
growing. If either the inflation of replacement
prices of physical capital or real capital ac-
cumulation is fast enough, the share of foreign
capital could rise for a period of years and
then decline. The maximum the foreign share
would attain and the time at which it would
top out vary with the assumed rates of capital
stock growth and the rate of capital price
appreciation.
197$ 7s 77 79 8’ 83 85 1987
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Figure 6
Foreign Share of Net U.S. Reproducible Capital
Stock Excluding Consumer Durables Collaterized by
Net Foreign Investment with Constant Capital Inflows






The U.S. capital stock grows each year by the
amount by which gross investment in new
buildings, roads, housing and industrial plant
and equipment exceeds the scrappage and
depreciation of the existing stock. The market
value of this stock also rises with inflation. As
was shown in chart 4, the estimated market
value of the U.S. nonconsumer capital stock
grew from $7.9 trillion at the end of 1981 to
$10.5 trillion at the end of 1987. Over this
period, the implicit annual rate of inflation of
capital stock replacement cost has averaged
about 2.3 percent, and the annual growth of
the real net stock (at 1982 prices) has averaged
about 2.2 percent. The sum of these two effects
in the 1980s has implied a nominal capital stock
growth rate of 4.5 percent. Combining these re-
cent trends, we can determine the long-term
consequences of a continued capital inflow.~~
As shown in figure 6, under these assump-
tions, which are most favorable to the threat
scenario, the foreign share actually would rise
to a maximum of 14.4 percent in the year 2015
“The period 1981-87 and the constant $120 billion inflow
are used in this discussion as they maximize the growth of
and the peak share attained by foreign capital. More
plausible rates are considered below. Nonetheless, the
fact that even indefinitely sustained capital inflows of over
$100 billion would be insufficient to support any traumatic
restructuring of the U.S. economy is consistent with
Mussa’s conjecture about surprisingly large equilibrium
U.S. current account deficits: As a result of the higher
growth rate of the U.S. population, its relatively younger
age distribution, the size of the U.S. economy and its at-
tractive investment opportunities, we should have an
equilibrium current account deficit of roughly one percent
of our GNP.” See Mussa (1985, p.146). In terms of the
1968 level of GNP of $5 trillion, this would imply an
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and then decline.” Since the assumed sustained
capital inflow is probably larger than most
analysts would assume, this is a worst-case
scenario. For example, under growth and inflation
rates averaged over the the full floating-rate era,
1973-87, the constant $120 billion capital inflow
would generate a peak share of 10.2 percent in
2004. Finally, if the capital inflow declines over
the near future as it has since 1987, then the
foreign share would peak in 1997 at about 7.3
percent.
Consequently, the growth of the foreign share of
U.S. capital, while large by 20th century ex-
perience, does not approach the share necessary
to corner the market. Even when expressed as a
claim on a subset of U.S. wealth—excluding con-
sumer durable goods, land, and human capital—
and presuming an investment pattern which
foreign investment has not exhibited, the share of
foreign investment does not present a credible
takeover threat to the American economy.
IS THE UNITED STATES REALLY
A NET DEBTOR?
Much of the concern about the economic
security of the United States was triggered by
the Department of Commerce estimate that the
U.S. net international investment position
became negative in 1985 (see table 1). The prox-
imate cause of the declining U.S. net investment
position is the U.S. current account deficits
since 1981. There is no question that the U.S.
international investment balance has declined as
a result of the relatively faster foreign invest-
ment in the United States than U.S. investment
abroad. In other words, there is no question
that the net capital flows have been into the
United States. Conversely, there is a very real
question whether the U.S. position has yet
become negative. The primary basis for this
skepticism is that direct investment is recorded
at its historic cost, which understates the cur-
rent market value by amounts that grow over
the years.
Recently, Ulan and Dewald (1989) have
estimated the net U.S. investment position [NIIPI
adjusting for the understatement of U.S. direct
foreign investment:
When direct investment is revalued to market, we
estimate that the U.S. NIIP as about $400 to $600
billion more than the official NtIP indicates
through the end of 1987, though, by all but the
earnings measure, the NHP is below its peak
values of 1980 or 1981.’~
In terms of the official Commerce Department
data reported in table 1, this would imply that
the U.S. position at the end of 1987 was a net
U.S. claim on foreigners of between $31 and
$231 billion. If the midpoint of this range is us-
ed as the appropriate point estimate, then given
the estimated $120 billion capital inflow in 1988,
the United States still held a net claim on
foreigners as of the end of 1988.
CONCLUSION
The joint implication from analysis of the three
aspects of foreign investment in the United
States—the effects on labor and investors, the
threat of withdrawal, and the relative size of the
foreign claim—is that the capaital inflows are
beneficient. The capital inflows benefit labor and
management, entrepreneurs and investors alike.
Workers benefit from the greater abundance of
tools; the increased capital raises labor’s produc-
“The year t~ foreign share, s(t*), of the U.S. nominal non-
consumer capital stock is the ratio of the sum of the initial
foreign net holding, $368.2 billion, of the nominal capital
stock plus the integral of the annual capital inflow, $120
billion, reduced by the rate of inflation of capital stock
replacement cost, to the growing real capital stock whose
1987 value is $10,514.3 billion:
s(t) =
($368.2 + $120 5 e”dt)
0
$10,514.3 e”
where s(t~)=share of net U.S. nonconsumer capital
collateralized against net foreign investment at
end of year
u = implicit rate of inflation of net capital stock’s
replacement cost;
g growth rate of real net capital stock due to in-
vestment, foreign and domestic.
‘~Ulan and Dewald use three different methods to estimate
the capital gains in the U.S. foreign direct investment and
the foreign direct investment in the United States: stock
price indexes, corporate earnings, investment goods price
deflators. Their estimates based on the capitalization pro-
vide the largest estimate of the U.S. undervaluation and
provide the clearest rebuttal of the transfer problem outlin-
ed by Drucker (1988). Their adjustments omit the U.S.
gold stock, which would add about $90 billion to the U.S.
position as reported by the Commerce Department (see
note 3 above); however, they also do not allow for a poten-
tial write-down of U.S.bank holdings of LDC debt which
they report would reduce the U.S. investment position by
about $50 billion.
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